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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The caption of this case contains the names of the
parties to this proceeding, except that Perry K. Bigelow
and Norma G. Bigelow are not parties to this appeal.
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether or not the trial court erred in refusina

to disturb its earlier judgment with respect to certain
property which was quieted in plaintiffs and from which
judgment defendant Cluff did not file a cross appeal.
2.

Whether or not the trial court erred in including

in its order on remand the following statement: "That all of
the claims raised by the defendants against the plaintiffs in
Civil No. 53,243 have been decided and are res judicata."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking to auiet title

to certain property shown as Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A
attached hereto.

Defendant Cluff counterclaimed attempting

to quiet title to that same property by virtue of the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence and also to quiet title to Parcel
W-X-Y-Z shown on Exhibit A.

The trial court quieted title to

Parcel P-M-N-0 in defendants Cluff and Bigelow and quieted
title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed
from the court's ruling with respect to the P-M-N-0 parcel
and defendant Cluff did not file a cross appeal with respect
to the court's ruling on the W-X-Y-Z parcel.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
judgment with respect to the P-M-N-0 parcel and remanded the
case to the District Court for the entry of a new decree with
respect to that parcel.
(Utah, 1984).

Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500

A copy of the ruling entered by the court upon

remand and the order which was entered pursuant thereto are
attached hereto as Exhibits B and C respectively.
On this appeal, defendant Cluff alleges the trial
court erred in refusing to disturb its prior findings and
judgment regarding the W-X-Y-Z parcel because of defendant
Cluff's failure to file a cross appeal. Defendant Cluff also
contends that paragragh #2 of Exhibit C does not reflect the
court's ruling.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
-2-

Inasmuch as defendant Cluff's appeal is based upon
issues of law presented to the trial court on remand, a
statement of facts is unnecessary to the resolution of this
appeal beyond what has been stated in the preceeding sections.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' arguments with respect to the first issue
presented for review may be summarized as follows:
1.

Defendant Cluff failed to file a cross-appeal with

respect to the trial court's judgment regarding Parcel
W-X-Y-Z and therefore that portion of the court's judgment is
not subject to a modification on appeal or on remand from the
appeal.
2.

In the course of the trial, defendant Cluff conceded

that plaintiffs were entitled to Parcel W-X-Y-Z by virtue of
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and therefore an
appeal from the portion of the court's judgment dealing with
that parcel would not be appropriate.
3.

The opinion of the court in Halladay v. Cluff,

supra, does not add a new element to the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence, but merely clarifies prior cases which
recognize the element of dispute or uncertainty.

Defendant

Cluff could have and should have raised that element as a
defense to plaintiff's claim to boundary by acquiescence with
respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z if in fact defendant Cluff had a
-3-

defense to plaintiff's claim.

Defendant Cluff's failure to

do so either in the lower court or on the prior appeal,
precludes her from asserting that position on this appeal.
4.

Defendant Cluff miscontrues the court's instructions

on remand.

The court reversed the trial court's ruling with

respect to Parcel A-B-C-D (which includes Parcel P-M-N-O) and
directed that the trial court enter a new decree in conformity
with the opinion of the court.

The court instructions by no

means intimated that the trial court's decree should be
modified with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z.
With respect to defendant's argument that paragraph 2 of
the order attached hereto as Exhibit C should be stricken, it
should be noted that that paragraph merely states what the
effect of the order would be without that express language.
The effect of the court's order without that language would
be to preclude defendant Cluff from again asserting claims
against plaintiffs with respect to either Parcel P-M-N-0 or
Parcel W-X-Y-Z.

Therefore, there is no reason to exclude

paragraph 2 from the court's order.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
DEFENDANT CLUFF HAVING ACQUIESCED IN THE JUDGMENT
RELATING TO PARCEL W-X-Y-Z AND HAVING FAILED TO FILE
A CROSS-APPEAL THEREFROM, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
LEFT UNDISTURBED ITS JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT THERETO
UPON REMAND FROM THIS COURT.
In this action plaintiffs sought to quiet title to
-4-

Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A by virtue of a recorded deed,
and also to quiet title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z on Exhibit A by
virtue of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

Defendant

Cluff asserted title to Parcel P-M-N-0 by virtue of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

This court having

ruled against defendant Cluff with respect to Parcel P-M-N-O,
defendant Cluff is now attempting to reverse the trial
court's order, from which no cross-appeal was filed, with
respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z.
Defendant Cluffs argument in this regard is that it
would be ludicrous for her to file a cross-appeal from a
judgment she believes she won. Yet, with respect to Parcel
W-X-Y-Z it is clear that defendant Cluff lost.

In fact,

during the course of the trial, defendant Cluff conceded that
plaintiffs were entitled to Parcel W-X-Y-Z by virtue of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and that issue was never
submitted to the court for decision.

During plaintiff's

cross examination of defendant Cluff the court called a bench
conference with counsel.

After the conference, which was had

off the record, the court stated:
THE COURT: As a result of a Bench Conference I think
there is no issue on that particular area, Mr. Young.
MR. YOUNG:
Exhibit 8?

The area of W",X",Y", and Z" on Plaintiff's

THE COURT: Yes.
(Trial Transcript page 134. Record at 173).
-5-

Thereafter, defendant Cluff did not claim an interest in
Parcel W-X-Y-Z.

Consequently, defendant Cluff did not file a

cross appeal with respect to the W-X-Y-Z property at the time
plaintiffs1 appealled from the court's decision with respect
to Parcel P-M-N-O.
Accordingly, not only did defendant Cluff fail to file a
cross appeal as required by Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (in effect at that time), but defendant Cluff would
not have been entitled to prevail on any such cross appeal by
virtue of conceding the issue in the trial court.

Defendant

Cluff would therefore have no grounds to appeal from an issue
to which she stipulated.
In any event, defendant Cluff having failed to comply with
Rule 74(b), defendant Cluff is now precluded from objecting to
that portion of the court's order dealing with the W-X-Y-Z
property.

This court has consistently held that the failure to

comply with Rule 74(b) precludes the consideration of issues
from which no appeal has been taken.

Bentley v. Potter,

694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984); Cerritos Trucking Company v. Utah
Venture No. 1, 645 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1982); Terry v. Zions
Cooperative Mercantile Institute, 617 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1980);
and Eliason v. Watts, 615 P. 2d 427 (Utah 1980).

In Terry v.

Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institute, supra, Rule 74(b) was
discussed in some length.

In that case the court stated:
-6-

The rule which deals with the problem of cross-appeals
is Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P., which states:
"For any one or more parties who have filed a
notice of appeal as required by Rule 73, other
parties may separately or together cross-appeal
without filing a notice a appeal; provided,
however, such party or parties shall file a
statement of points on which he intends to rely on
such cross-appeal within the time and as required
by subdivision (b) of Rule 75."
As to the time limitation, Rule 75(b) states:
"If the respondent desires to cross-appeal,
or if the appellant has filed a statement of the
points... and the respondent desires to have the
appellate court consider other or additonal matters,
the respondent shall, within 10 days after the service
and filing of appellant's designation... serve and
file a statement of respondent's points either by way
of such cross-appeal or for the purpose of having
considered other or additional matters than those
raised by the appellant."
From the just quoted rules it could hardly be clearer
that if a respondent desires to attack the judgment and
change it in his favor, he must timely file a cross-appeal
which plainly states the propositions he intends to rely
on as entitling him to relief. This conforms with the
desired objective of giving his opponent and the court a
clear and definite understanding of the issues to be
treated and of thus providing a firm foundation upon
which the case is to proceed. (Emphasis in original).
617 P. 2d 701.
Defendant Cluff having failed to file and perfect a
cross-appeal, the district court correctly refused to disturb
its findings as to Parcel W-X-Y-Z.
Defendant Cluff contends that this court's decision
in Halladay v. Cluff, supra, added an element to the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence and that based on the added
-7-

element, plaintiffs are not entitled to prevail with respect
to Parcel W-X-Y-Z.

However, this court's opinion in Halladay

v. Cluff, supra, merely clarifies the elements of boundary by
acquiescence which have been stated in prior cases. The
element of dispute or uncertainty had been recognized prior
to the trial of this case and in fact plaintiffs argued that
principle to the trial court.

See Halladay v. Cluff, supra,

at pp. 504-505. Defendant Cluff could have made the same
argument with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z but failed to do
so.
Defendant Cluff further contends that this court's
statement in the prior appeal that "[T]he decree is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the District Court for the entry
of a new decree in conformity with this opinion," entitles
defendant Cluff to a reversal of the trial court's judgment
with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z.

Defendant Cluff reasons that

since the trial court applied the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence to both Parcel W-X-Y-Z and Parcel P-M-N-O, that
if this court reversed the lower court with regard to Parcel
P-M-N-O, that on remand, the trial court should have also
reversed as to Parcel W-X-Y-Z.

Defendant Cluff is attempting

to persuade this court that either the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence applies to both parcels or it does not apply
to either parcel.

The underlying facts so not appear to be
-8-

significant to defendant Cluff. Obviously, this argument is
nonsense.

Defendant Cluff even recognized one distinguishing

factual circumstance in her brief.
The trial court recognized and counsel conceded that the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence clearly applied to
Parcel W-X-Y-Z and consequently that issue was not contested.
However, the applicability of boundary by acquiescence with
respect to Parcel P-M-N-0 was contested, was litigated, and
the trial court was found to be in error by this court in the
earlier appeal.
Defendant Cluff is reading too much into the court's
statement cited above. Defendant Cluff fails to quote other
statements of the court in that opinion such as the following:
On appeal the Halladays seek to overturn that
decision on the basis that boundary by acquiescence
cannot be applied where there was no dispute or
uncertainty concerning the location of the boundary.
We agree and reverse with directions to quiet title in
the Halladays, the record owners.
*

*

*

Consequently, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
is inapplicable as a matter of law in the circumstances
of this case. The decree
relying on that doctrine in
quieting the claimants1 title to Parcel A-B-C-D must
therefore be reversed.
The decree is reversed and the case is remanded
to the District Court for the entry of a new decree
in conformity with this opinion.
685 P. 2d 502, 507-508.
To be in conformity with this court's opinion, the trial
-9-

court on remand could only modify that portion of the judgment
dealing with Parcel A-B-C-D (which includes Parcel P-M-N-O)
and had no authority to modify the judgment with respect to
Parcel W-X-Y-Z.
well taken.

Defendant Cluff's appeal in this case is not

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court

affirm the order of the lower court which is attached hereto
as Exhibit C.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ENTERED UPON REMAND OF
THIS CASE HAS THE EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA AS TO
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS ACTION.
Defendant Cluff's second point on appeal was that paragraph #2 of the court's order attached hereto as Exhibit C
should be stricken.

That statement reads as follows:

2. That all of the claims raised by the defendants
as against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53f243 have been
decided and are res judicata.
That statement was placed in the order in light of defendant
Cluff's argument to the trial court that title to Parcel
W-X-Y-Z should be quieted in defendant Cluff.

The effect of

the order with respect to that parcel of property is the same
with or without the cited language.

The order has the effect

of precluding defendant Cluff from again raising any issues
with regard to the W-X-Y-Z property by virtue of the doctrine
of res judicata without the order expressly so stating.
Therefore, there would be no reason to eliminate that language
-10-

and the court's order should stand as is.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Cluff having conceded to the trial court's
judgment with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z and having failed to
perfect any cross-appeal with respect to that property, and
the court's order entered upon remand of the case from this
court having the effect of res judicata with respect to that
property, plaintiffs respectfully request that the court's
order entered October 18, 1984 be affirmed.
Dated this 3

day of April, 1985.

BRENT D. YOUNG/)
Attorney for Ij(espondents

-11-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents,
postage prepaid, to S. Rex Lewis, Esq., Attorney for Defendant
Bigelow, and to M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., Attorney for Defendant
Cluff, addressed follows this

day of April, 1985.

S. REX LEWIS
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorney at Law
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
84601
M. DAYLE JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorney at Law
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah
84601

BRENT D. £OUN
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MACK HALLADAY and
MERLE HALLADAY,

Civil No. 53243

Plaintiffs,
vs.

R U L I N G

MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K.
BIGELOW and NORMA G.
BIGELOW,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the 21st day of September,
1984, wherein the Court heard oral argument from counsel as to the disposition to be made of this case on remand from the Supreme Court, and
all of counsel were heard and the Court having thoroughly.the alternatives, and the language of the Supreme Court directing that they
" . . . reverse with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the
record owners."
It is noted that the defendants Halladay appealed from the Court1<
Ruling as to that portion of Defendants' Exhibit 12 identified as "A",
"B", "C", "D" or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal was taken as to the
Court's fir:dine of boundary bv accuiescence as to Tracts 1 and 2 in

Bicelow and Cluff respectively.

Therefore, the only matter before the

Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3 and that the same be quieted
the record owners.

m

The Court therefore directs counsel for Halladays

to prepare a new Decree quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3
alona the description contained from points "A" to^'B" to "C" to "D".
Dated a: Provo, Utah County, Utah, this J-7

day of September,

1984.

GEOR^^E. L^LI^T" JUD9E

BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT
84603
Telephone: 37 5-3000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE
KALLADAY,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
vs.
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW
and NORMA G. BIGELOW,

Civil No. 53,243

Defendants.
This matter came before the court on the 21st day of September,
1984, wherein the court heard oral argument from counsel as to
the disposition to be made of this case on remand from the
Supreme Court, and all of counsel were heard and the court having
thoroughly considered the alternatives, and the language of the
Supreme Court directing that they " . . .

reverse with directions

to quiet title in the Halladays, the record owners."
It is noted that the plaintiffs Halladay appealed from the
court's ruling as to that portion of defendant's Exhibit 12
identified as "A,T, "E", "C", f,Dn or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal
was taken as to the court's finding of boundary by acquiescence
as to Tracts 1 and 2 in Bigelow and Cluff respectively.

Therefore,

the only matter before the Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3
and that the saire be cuieted in the record owners.

The court

therefore directs counsel for Halladays to prepare a new decree
quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3 along the description contained froir, points "A" to "Bw to "C" to " D \
Based upon the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That title to the following described property is

is quieted in plaintiffs, Kack Halladay and Merle Halladay:
Commencing 488.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North
from the Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
thence West 118.10 feet, thence North 0° 03' 17"
East along a fence line 55.31 feet, thence South 89°
51f 20" East along a fence line 118.20 feet thence
South 0° 09' 25" West along a fence line, 55.01 feet
to the point of beginning. Area .15 acres.
2.

That all other claims raised by the defendants as

against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53,243 have been decided and
are res judicata.
Dated:

October

/ !f

, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

-2-

